Splitting the Baby : Media Constructions of Grutter v. Bollinger and Gratz v. Bollinger by Jones, Augustus et al.
Journal of Political Science 
Volume 34 Number 1 Article 5 
November 2006 
"Splitting the Baby": Media Constructions of Grutter v. Bollinger 
and Gratz v. Bollinger 
Augustus Jones 
Michelle D. Deardorff 
Michelle G. Briscoe 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.coastal.edu/jops 
 Part of the Political Science Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Jones, Augustus; Deardorff, Michelle D.; and Briscoe, Michelle G. (2006) ""Splitting the Baby": Media 
Constructions of Grutter v. Bollinger and Gratz v. Bollinger," Journal of Political Science: Vol. 34 : No. 1 , 
Article 5. 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.coastal.edu/jops/vol34/iss1/5 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Politics at CCU Digital Commons. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Journal of Political Science by an authorized editor of CCU Digital Commons. For more 
information, please contact commons@coastal.edu. 
"Splitting the Baby": 
Media Constructions of Grutterv. 
Bollingerand Gratzv. Bollinger 
Augustus Jones 
Miami University 
Michelle D. Deardorff 
Jackson State University 
Michelle G. Briscoe 
Miami University 
Scholarship on the judicia, y indicates that the ability of the media to 
interpret accurately and describe clearly judicial decisions, and more 
specifically Supreme Court decisions, is limited. Since the public gen-
erally relies on media accounts to find out what the High Court has 
decided, this limitation is significant. We investigate whether the print 
media accurately described the Supreme Courts recent decisions in the 
two affirmative action cases of Grutter v. Bollinger and Gratz v. Bollin-
ger (2003). We find that most newspapers addressed the legal queries 
in both cases, expressed support for these split judgments, and consid-
ered some of the repercussions of these rulings. However, the press 
generally failed to discuss dissenting opinions, relevant background 
information, and potential implications of the ruling. As a result, the 
public was deprived of contextual knowledge and information neces-
sary for developing informed judgments about these decisions and the 
public issues they involve. 
Judicial scholars assert that members of the press play a cru-cial role in communicating Supreme Court decisions. In fact, they tell us that the public generally does not read Supreme 
Court decisions; rather, they rely on press accounts to discover 
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what the High Court has decided . Scholars also emphasize that 
media coverage of Supreme Court directives is often limited and 
misleading . Deadlines , space limitations , and the difficult proc-
ess of reducing lengthy, convoluted, and legalistic language into 
brief , comprehensible and coherent sentences help explain why 
the press has not always done an effective job in explaining Su-
preme Court directives. Supreme Court justices have hinted or 
even stated explicitly that press accounts do not accurately report 
what they have decided. 
In this study, we investigate whether the media have accu-
rately described the Supreme Court 's recent affirmative action 
decisions . The Grutter case questioned whether the University of 
Michigan Law School could consider race and ethnicity, among 
other factors, in making admission decisions. By contrast, Gratz 
focused on whether the University of Michigan's Undergraduate 
Admission Office can utilize race as a factor in selecting stu-
dents. The decisions-simultaneously endorse and reject the use 
of affirmative action in a single institution- have been seen by 
many journalists as "splitting the baby," referencing the wisdom 
of King Solomon in rendering a difficult decision . In conducting 
our investigation , we analyze immediate newspaper coverage of 
these decisions. We assess whether coverage was provided; 
whether the legal issues taken up in these cases, and the reason-
ing of the Court 's majority and dissenting opinions, were men-
tioned ; whether the accounts expressed agreement or disagree-
ment with the decisions; and whether the impact and implica-
tions of these decrees were discussed. These variables are se-
lected because scholars who have probed newspaper coverage of 
Supreme Court judgments have typically considered them in as-
sessing whether the media is able to depict accurately the Court 's 
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reasonmg and outcomes immediately after decisions are ren-
dered. 
The Relation ship of the Media to the Courts 
Unlike the other branches of the federal government, the ju-
diciary does not speak directly to the public ; consequently, the 
media's interpretation of the Supreme Court is very significant. 
As an unelected branch in a majoritarian political system, the 
judiciary requires public approval and support to maintain the 
legitimacy it needs to be effective. Yet, courts do not directly 
communicate with the public outside of their legal rulings. The 
media is generally the filter through which the public under-
stands the courts , discovers the decisions of the courts , and inter-
prets the implications of the courts' determinations (Jamieson 
1998). As Elliot Slotnick and Jennifer Segal (1998, 1) have ar-
gued 
[I]n democratic political systems , the interaction and com-
munication between political elites and institutions and the 
mass public are considered of primary importance . Because 
democratic governments are established to serve their citi-
zens, the flow of information between elites and masses is 
critical to the functioning of these governments and to their 
perceived legitimacy. Ideally, effective democratic citizen-
ship requires that the people know about the activities of 
their officials and institutions so that they may protect their 
interests by evaluating and holding them accountable for 
their actions . Political information is significant for the op-
timal functioning of this process . 
As the highest court in the land, the Supreme Court is particu-
larly dependent on the media . Judicial scholars assert that mem-
bers of the press play a crucial role in communicating both Su-
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preme Court decisions (Wasby 1978; Baum 1998; Canon and 
Johnson 1999) and in covering appellate court decision-making 
(Newland 1964; Larson 1985; Slotnick and Segal 1998). The 
public relies on press accounts, both articles and editorials, to 
find out what the High Court has actually decided (Slotnick and 
Segal 1998). Accuracy in media coverage would seem to be very 
important for the Supreme Court to maintain its legitimacy, as 
the Court frequently requires public approval to ensure proper 
enforcement of its rulings by the electorally-accountable 
branches of government (Davis 1994; Canon and Johnson 1999; 
Davis and Strickler 2000). 
Scholarship on the judiciary has demonstrated that the ability 
of the media to interpret accurately and describe clearly the deci-
sions of the judiciary , and more specifically the Supreme Court, 
is limited. Deadlines, space limitations, a reduction in the regular 
coverage of the Courts, as well as the difficult process of reduc-
ing lengthy, convoluted , and legalistic language into brief, com-
prehensible, and coherent sentences, are some of the reasons 
why the press has not always done an effective job in explaining 
Supreme Court directives (Ginsburg 1995; Fleeson 2002). In 
addition, the federal judiciary, especially the Supreme Court, 
have policies and practices that distract from quality media cov-
erage (Ginsburg 1995; Greenhouse 1996). Such policies include 
a refusal to comment on decisions beyond that provided by their 
written opinions, and their closed conference deliberations. 
Hence , it is not surprising that Supreme Court justices have 
themselves indicated that press accounts do not accu_rately report 
what they have decided. According to Laurence Baum (1998, 
381): 
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Justice O'Connor has observed [that] 'The summaries of the 
opinions of this Court carried in the media ... frequently pro-
vide a perspective , not only on the work of the court but also 
on the perceptions and judgments of the reporters and their 
editors .' Likewise, Justice Brennan has suggested that the 
media 's attacks on the Court 's decisions affecting the media 
themselves are umeasonable , unintelligent , and inaccurate . 
121 
These limitations are exacerbated by the fact that much court 
coverage is reported by journalists with limited legal training 
who are waiting for more glamorous posts at the White House or 
on the Hill. Issues that are more salient to the public, such as 
controversies over individual rights, are deemed more newswor-
thy and tend to attract more media scrutiny than topics with 
greater doctrinal importance or constitutional significance (Katsh 
1983; Haltom 1998; Slotnick and Segal 1998). The consequence 
of these factors has been a public that obtains its information 
about a significant institution through a medium, both print and 
televised, that does not prioritize the quality or quantity of its 
judicial coverage. Yet we know that one of the most significant 
factors related to the effective implementation of Supreme Court 
decisions is public support and approval (Canon and Johnson 
1999). 
Limited research has been conducted on the implementation 
and impact of Supreme Court decisions on affirmative action in 
higher education (the few exceptions are Dreyfuss and Lawrence 
III 1979; Ball 2000). More extensive research has been con-
ducted on school desegregation , prayer in schools, libel law, the 
rights of the accused, and reapportionment. One possible reason 
for such limited scholarship might be the few rulings the Court 
has issued on the topic. But in the summer of 2003, the Supreme 
Court rendered two highly significant decisions in Gratz v. 
Bolling er and Grutter v. Bolling er. 
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Prior to 2003, the last significant Supreme Court precedent on 
the issue of affirmative action in higher education was in 1978, 
in the plurality decision of Regents of the University of Califor-
nia v. Bakke . As part of their study twenty years later, in Televi-
sion News and the Supreme Court: All the News Thats Fit to Air, 
Slotnick and Segal (1998 , 151-152) carefully examined televi-
sion coverage of the Bakke case, and found that the salience of 
the issue of affirmative action in higher education led to an 
atypically high level of television coverage; rarely has there been 
so much media scrutiny over a single case. They discovered, 
however , that the Court's decision in Bakke was not accurately 
portrayed in the televised reports. Slotnick and Segal (1998 , 109) 
argued that the choice of 
utilizing the personage of Allan Bakke to focus on the issue 
of quotas and " less qualified " minorities was understandable 
for the network newscasts. The issues contained drama and 
controversy and, clearly, represent what television news 
seeks the most of and does best. Furthermore , divergence in 
standardized scores was an easy topic for journalists to por-
tray in the news format .... Yet to the extent that such re-
porting suggested that blacks admitted under the UC-Davis 
plan were "unqualified " (and, on balance, the reports ap-
peared to do just that), news coverage misreported and mis-
represented an important fact in the case . 
This inaccuracy may have strongly influenced the public per-
ception of affirmative action in higher education as unfair. 
After Bakke , the Supreme Court abdicated its authority and 
allowed lower federal courts to make decisions that appeared to 
eradicate the ruling made in Bakke, and by refusing to hear the 
challenges to these decisions , allowed them to stand. This was 
most specifically the case in the Fifth Circuit decision of Texas v. 
Hopwood (1996). Most of the controversy around the appellate 
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court's decision focused on the fact that a federal appellate panel 
determined that the Court's ruling in Bakke , which held that cre-
ating a diverse student body is a compelling governmental inter-
est, was no longer a binding precedent. This was especially sig-
nificant because the Supreme Court had not overturned Bakke. 
Hence, for those mostly conservative political actors who hoped 
to find affirmative action unconstitutional , the University of 
Michigan cases were of critical importance; they determined the 
scope of the application of the Hopwood decision. President 
George Bush and the Solicitor General decided to use Grutter 
and Gratz to challenge Bakke and the use of affirmative action in 
higher education. The salience of this issue for many public ac-
tors and the general public is manifest in the fact that the Michi-
gan cases attracted more amicus curiae briefs than even the pre-
vious record-holder, Webster v. Reproductive Health Services 
(1989). Thus, the 2003 cases of Grutter and Gratz clearly repre-
sented an opportunity for the Court to address the issues once 
again. But did the media do a more accurate job in interpreting 
these two cases than it had in Bakke? This is the main question 
we address in this study. 
There are two reasons for performing this analysis. The first 
is that as far as we can determine, no other study has systemati-
cally probed press coverage of Grutter v. Bollinger and Gratz v. 
Bollinger. We intend to fill this gap in the literature by exploring 
how newspapers construed the Supreme Court's decrees. The 
second rationale for this analysis is that previous studies of Su-
preme Court decisions have mainly concentrated on school 
vouchers (Jones and Briscoe 2002), school desegregation (Or-
field, Eaton , and Harvard Project on School Desegregation 
1996), prayer in public schools (Dolbeare and Hammond 1971 ), 
libel (Gruhl 1980), the rights of the accused (Canon 1973), and 
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reapportionment (McCubbins and Schwartz 1988). Fewer studies 
have focused on affirmative action (Urofsky 1997). By paying 
attention to media constructions of the Supreme Court 's recent 
affirmative action decisions, and by taking into consideration the 
variables weighed in other studies, this analysis contributes to a 
small but growing body of literature. 
DATA AND FINDINGS 
We identified 32 national and regional newspapers and exam-
ined all articles and editorials that mentioned Gratz and Grutter 
during the period of June 23, 2003 through December 31, 2003 .1 
Newspapers were selected to ensure adequate coverage of the 
entire country. The data pool emphasizes newspapers with large 
circulation s, without duplicating regional coverage whenever 
possible (e.g., Ohio has three major papers with large circula-
tions-only one was selected). These sources were evaluated in 
light of whether or not they covered the Gratz and Grutter cases; 
called attention to the legal issues in these lawsuits; explained 
the legal reasoning behind the decrees; indicated agreement or 
disagreement with judgments ; and examined the impact and im-
plications of these rulings. 
1 The data pool inc ludes: the Atlanta Co11slitution, the Boston Globe, the Chicago Su11-
Times, Chrislian Science Monitor, the Columbus Dispat ch, the Denver Post, Hartford 
Courant, the Hous/011 Chronicle, Los Angeles Times, the U11ion Leader (Manchester, 
NH ), the Commercial Appeal (Memphi s, TN ), Milwaukee Journal Sentinel, Star Tribune 
(Minn eapolis, MN), Times Picayune (New Orl ean s, LA), Newsday (New York), the New 
York Times, the Virginia Pilot (No rfolk, VA), the Oakland Tribune, Pillsburgh Post-
Gazelle, Richmond Times Dispat ch, St. Louis Post Dispatch , St. Petersburg Times, Sall 
Lake Tribune, San Antonio Express-News, the San Francisco Chronicle, USA Today, the 
Washington Post, and the Washington Times. 
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Coverage of Cases 
The first question the study addresses is to what degree the 
newspapers selected for mentioning Grutter and Gratz actually 
covered the decisions. According to this analysis, "cover" means 
that the newspaper called attention to these rulings in a front 
page article , cited both cases in their headlines , or reported both 
cases within forty-eight hours after the High Court handed down 
the decisions. The objective was to analyze the articles that 
would most immediately frame the reader 's understanding of the 
issue. Using these standards , all of the selected newspapers cov-
ered the Supreme Court 's decisions in Grutter and Gratz (see 
Table 1 below) . The widespread coverage probably reflected 
both recognition of public salience and the fact that the two cases 
marked the first time in 25 years that the Court ruled on whether 
universities could consider race in admitting students. As the 
literature demonstrates , landmark cases do enjoy much greater 
coverage by the press than do typical rulings. We evaluate below 
the coverage and assessment provided by those papers that wrote 
editorials on these cases. 
The Mention of Legal Issues 
The second question probes whether newspapers mentioned 
the legal issues in their coverage of the Supreme Court 's deci-
sion-making. The key legal query in Grutter was whether the 
University of Michigan Law School could consider race in se-
lecting students , and the key question in Gratz was whether or 
not the University of Michigan's undergraduate admissions of-
fice violated the Constitution when it implemented a race-
sensitive admission policy. We found that 91 % of the newspapers 
accurately cited the legal questions in both cases . This is not sur-
VOL. 34 2006 
126 JONES, DEA RDORFF & BRISC OE 
prising insofar as the questions in both cases were straightfor-
ward and were clearly articulated in the cases: the first queried 
Table 1, 
Summary of Newspapers' Coverage of Gratz and Grutter 
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whether the law school contravened the Constitution by using 
race as one among many factors in selecting students, while the 
second asked whether the undergraduate office disobeyed the 
Constitution by inappropriately weighing race as a factor in the 
admissions process. Although nearly all the newspapers men-
tioned the legal issues, how they provided their analyses varied. 
Two observations about the headlines are in order, First , most 
newspaper headlines accurately reported that the High Court 
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rendered two affirmative action decisions--one upholding af-
firmative action and the other striking it down. Specifically, we 
found that 19 newspapers noted that the Supreme Court issued 
two opinions concerning affirmative action policies at the Uni-
versity of Michigan while 13 did not. The headline in the Co-
lumbus Dispatch typified press accounts that accurately depicted 
what the Court decided. That headline read "U.S. Supreme Court 
Affirmative Action; Justices OK Race-Based Admissions with 
Limits; Law School Policy at Michigan Upheld: Undergraduate 
Rules Go Too Far, Court Says" (Torry 2003). Similarly, the Los 
Angeles limes, in a more general fashion, conveyed the same 
message. It notes "Supreme Court Rulings; Court Affirms Use of 
Race in University Admissions: Justices Render Two Close De-
cisions Involving the University of Michigan, One Stresses the 
Need for Affirmative Action, the Other Reasserts Limits." While 
the Los Angeles limes did not draw a distinction between the law 
school and the undergraduate programs, the headline transmitted 
the message that one affirmative action policy at the University 
could be justified while the other could not (Savage 2003). 
While 59% of the newspapers bore headlines that recognized 
that the Supreme Court rendered two opinions, only the Denver 
Post identified in detail the names of both cases, as well as the 
substance of the Court's ruling. This paper's headline read: 
Court backs diversity in college admissions; Landmark rul-
ing keeps affirmative action alive; Grutter vs. Bollinger : Su-
preme Court in a 5-4 vote upholds a program at University 
of Michigan's law school that gives race a limited edge in 
admissions decisions. Gratz vs. Bollinger: Court strikes 
down in a separate 6-3 vote a point system used by the Uni-
versity of Michigan to give minorities preference in under-
graduate admissions (Farrell 2003). 
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When compared to the other newspapers, this lengthy 62-word 
caption is unusual, but it does succeed in disseminating impor-
tant information about the cases to its audience. 
Rationales Behind Grutter and Gratz 
The third question asks whether the newspapers report the 
explanations behind the justices' varied opinions. Did the press 
cover the majority and dissenting opinions in Grutter and Gratz? 
Six Justices (Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor, 
Ginsburg, Scalia, Thomas, and Kennedy) composed opinions in 
the two cases. Justice O'Connor authored the majority opinion in 
Grutter, joined by Justices Stevens, Souter, Breyer, and Gins-
burg. Justices Scalia and Thomas sided with a portion of 
O'Connor's opinion in which she expressed the belief that in 25 
years the Court would no longer consider race in selecting stu-
dents. O'Connor made clear that, in the meantime, the University 
of Michigan Law School could consider race as a factor in se-
lecting students because multiple educational benefits flow from 
a diverse student body. 
Justice Ginsburg also authored a concurring opinion in 
which she backed major portions of O'Connor's decision, but 
questioned the section that stressed that universities would be 
barred from weighing race as a factor in selecting students in 25 
years. Justice Thomas wrote a separate opinion in which he 
agreed in part with O'Connor's Grutter decision. Specifically, 
Thomas sided with O'Connor's view that in 25 years universities 
should discontinue using race in making admissions decisions. 
Like Thomas, Justice Scalia also sided with that segment of 
O'Connor's Gratz opinion in which she stipulated that a deadline 
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should be set when universities would no longer be able to util-
ize race in the admission process. 
Chief Justice Rehnquist, joined by Justices Kennedy, Scalia, 
and Thomas, dissented. His primary objection was that the Law 
School's effort to attain a critical mass of minority students was 
a transparent effort to promote a racial quota. Thomas also com-
posed a dissenting opinion in which he expressed disagreement 
with a portion of O'Connor's majority opinion. He took issue 
with the majority's argument that the Constitution permitted uni-
versities to consider race, along with other factors, in creating a 
diverse student body. Scalia also wrote a dissent in which he ob-
jected to the portion of the majority opinion that suggested edu-
cational benefits flow from a heterogeneous student body. Jus-
tice Kennedy's separate dissent posited that the Court misapplied 
the strict scrutiny test. In other words, Kennedy maintained that 
if the Court had clearly applied this particular standard, the law 
school's affirmative action plan would have been stricken. 
Disagreements among the justices were similarly reflected in 
the Gratz decision, in which seven justices composed opinions. 
Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for himself and Justices 
O'Connor, Scalia, Breyer, and Kennedy, pointed out that the 
University of Michigan's undergraduate program's point system 
was constitutionally defective because it did not consider all fac-
ets of an applicant's file. O'Connor generally concurred with 
Rehnquist and added that the University's undergraduate admis-
sions office policy was fundamentally different from the law 
school policy. Thomas underscored the point that under the Con-
stitution, universities should not take race into account. Breyer 
disagreed with Thomas, but argued that the University of Michi-
gan's undergraduate admission's office relied too heavily on race 
in selecting students. 
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In his dissenting opinion, Stevens indicated that the Court 
should never have granted the litigants standing in Gratz. Souter 
likewise argued that the litigants had no personal stake in the 
outcome of the case, and also took issue with the majority's as-
sertion that race played a predominant role in the undergraduate 
admissions policy. Ginsburg's dissenting opinion observed that 
the undergraduate system of awarding points on race to minority 
students was constitutionally acceptable because it helped minor-
ity groups who have historically and presently been affected by 
discrimination. 
None of the 32 papers covered all of the opinions announced 
in Gratz and Grutter. What they do cover are the key majority 
opinions in both cases. All of the newspapers examined include 
at least a brief statement regarding the Supreme Court's majority 
opinion in Grutter. Most of the newspapers cite Justice 
O'Connor as the author for the majority's decree in Grutter. 
Many offer quotes from Justice O'Connor to help explain how 
the Court's majority reached its conclusions. For example, using 
O'Connor's explanation that Michigan's law school utilized a 
"highly individualized, holistic review of each applicant's file," 
newspapers detailed the Court's reasoning in Grutter. However, 
aside from these commonalities, the newspapers are quite varied 
in the amount of detail they give to their explanations of the 
Court's reasoning, particularly in regard to dissenting opinions. 
Some articles merely note that the Court was "highly divided," 
while others offer hints in their headlines as to what the divisions 
meant in terms of the Justices' interpretation of the Bakke case. 
As the Boston Herald explained, "a sharply divided Supreme 
Court said colleges and universities may use race," but the article 
does not offer any insight into the dissension on the Court or 
how the justices interpreted Bakke in light of constitutional stan-
dards (Rothstein 2003). 
VOL. 34 2006 
SPL/7T!NG THE BABY 131 
Regarding the dissenting opinions, 75% of the newspapers 
did not do a thorough job of explaining the dissenter's view-
points. In fact , many do not mention anything about the dissent-
ing opinion, not even naming which justices dissented. One 
newspaper , the New York Times, was very detailed in its account-
ing of the opposing viewpoints of the Court. The Times summa-
rized its understanding this way: 
Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist wrote the principal dis-
senting opinion that spoke for all four including Justice An-
thony M. Kennedy. He took a more oblique approach that at-
tacked the law school program not so much for its premise 
as for how it works in practice, dismissing it as 'a carefully 
managed program designed to ensure proportionate repre-
sentation of applicants from selected minority groups.' Jus-
tice Kennedy, writing separately, said that Justice Powell's 
opinion in the Bakke case ' states the correct rule for resolv-
ing this case,' but that the court had not applied the 'mean-
ingful strict scrutiny' under which the program should have 
been found unconstitutional (Greenhouse 2003). 
The explicit coverage by the New York Times is not surpris-
ing. As often noted in the scholarly literature, the New York 
Times is one of the few print outlets that has continuously em-
phasized the significance of the courts. The Times has one of the 
few reporters dedicated to Supreme Court coverage , and this re-
porter , Linda Greenhouse, is renown for her consistently high 
level of analysis (Davis 1994, Haltom 1998). 
Newsday was similarly explicit , clarifying that four Justices 
dissented, that Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote the main dissent , 
and that Justices Kennedy and Scalia wrote separate dissents. 
The reporter, Tom Brune, was careful to clarify how the dissent-
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ers agreed and disagreed relative to the Bakke decision, as the 
following excerpt demonstrates . 
In a separate dissent , Justice Anthony M. Kennedy endorsed 
Powell 's diversity rationale , but said that the majority had 
failed to properly apply strict scrutiny to the law school's 
program. Chief Justice William Rehnquist and Justices An-
tonin Scalia and Clarence Thomas rejected Powell's diver-
sity rationale . Rehnquist rejected the law school's policy as 
"racial balancing. " Thomas found all use of race in admis-
sions to be unconstitutional. But Scalia issued the harshest 
dissent , calling the diversity rationale "a patriotic , all-
American system of racial discrimination " and attacking 
Michigan for its "maintaining a ' prestige ' law school whose 
normal admissions standards" exclude minorities (Brune 
2003). 
Newspapers that provided details regarding dissenting opin-
ions, such as the names of dissenters, often quoted Justice Cla-
rence Thomas and identified him as the Court's only black mem-
ber. A majority of those newspapers whose analysis indicated a 
lack of support for one or both rulings cited Justice Thomas' 
quotation of Frederick Douglass' 1865 address to abolitionists . 
Thomas, upholding his long-standing opposition to affirmative 
action, stated that blacks only needed justice, not pity-" simply 
justice ... all I ask is, give him a chance to stand on his own legs. 
Let him alone." Newspapers also frequently referenced Justice 
Thomas' statement that, "I believe blacks can achieve in every 
avenue of American life without the meddling of university ad-
ministrators" (see, e.g., MacDonald (2003)) . While we cannot 
forget the constraints of space in a newspaper, the selective dis-
cussion of concurring and dissenting opinions in stories appear 
to be designed to support the reporter 's analysis as to the wisdom 
of the decisions. 
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Richard Davis (1994 , 67) quotes a new Supreme Court press 
corps member as explaining the significance of space limitations: 
"When my job first opened , my editors interviewed about a half 
dozen lawyers thinking at first they really wanted someone with 
a law degree . They realized these people were interested in tiny 
legal twists and turns of opinion and not the larger picture. When 
you only have 20 inches to write a story, you really need to be 
general and you need to grab that reader ." 
Finally , the press may not have reported all decisions be-
cause they did not deem the concurring and dissenting opinions 
important to the readers ' understanding of the case . The majority 
opinion is what results in the actual determination of the law, so 
concurring and dissenting opinions may be perceived as only 
more obiter dicta and not relevant to an understanding of the 
case 's determination . 
Support or Non-Support for Grutter and Gratz 
With respect to the question of whether the newspapers indi-
cated approval or disapproval of these affirmative action rulings, 
we discovered that most of the newspapers ' editorials demon-
strate agreement with the Supreme Court's split decisions in 
Grutter and Gratz. They endorse the Grutter decree that said 
that the University of Michigan Law School could weigh race as 
a factor in admitting students , and they support the Gratz ruling 
which held that the University of Michigan's undergraduate ad-
mission office used race in an unlawful fashion when it awarded 
points partly on the basis of race . Interestingly , the newspaper 
editors generally reason that race can be used but not too much. 
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In conclusion, in this set of cases, the majority opinions are 
consistently announced, while concurring and dissenting opin-
ions are generally ignored. The majority opinions are likely cited 
because the O'Connor opinion made plain that universities could 
consider race in admission processes, something the Court had 
not reaffirmed in 25 years, while the Rehnquist majority was 
likely highlighted because it indicated what kind of affirmative 
action plan is constitutional. The newspapers' failure to report all 
opinions might be explained by three factors articulated in the 
literature. 
First, the need to communicate to a mass audience helps ex-
plain why the media ignored key elements of the decisions such 
as "strict scrutiny," "compelling state interest," "narrowly tai-
lored," and "standing." Relatedly, and as the scholarly literature 
indicates, outside of the few regularly assigned Supreme Court 
reporters, many members of the press who cover the Court are 
not legally trained (Davis 1994). Tony Mauro, who covered the 
Court for USA Today, Legal Times, and Gannett News Services, 
has argued that not having a formal legal background was an 
asset to his legal reporting. "It makes it easier to explain to lay 
people if I've gone through the same basic questions the reader 
has when I'm writing the story. I can still ask dumb questions. I 
feel I'm not as tempted to write in legalese" (Davis 1994, 67). 
This reasoning appears operative in much of the coverage in the 
Michigan cases. Reporters said little to nothing about Justice 
Steven's suggestion that the Court should have dismissed Gratz 
because the litigant lacked standing. In addition, the press did not 
report on Justice Kennedy's claim that the Court did not properly 
apply the strict scrutiny test. 
Second, the press may not record all opinions because of the 
limited space allotted to coverage of Supreme Court decisions. 
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The following editorial from the Houston Chronicle captures the 
view of the majority of editorials. 
Monday 's two-pronged decision was in some ways an up-
holding of the 1978 Bakke case . .. and a rejection of the 
immediate challenge to the long-established precedent. But 
it also more narrowly defined the ways "affirmative action" 
is deemed constitutionally acceptable. The broader residual 
argument, however, is about the value of diversity and the 
undesirability of homogeneity. The Michigan cases served to 
highlight that issue to an unprecedented degree. The level of 
support from corporate America , past and present military 
leaders and others who filed "friend of the court" briefs in 
favor of the effort to provide equal opportunity across the 
board is remarkable. . . . Chief Justice William Rehnquist 
declared for the majority that the program for the under-
graduate college went too far in providing an advantage to 
the selected minorities and thus violated the constitutional 
equal protection provisions (Reinert and Nissimov 2003). 
Citing the Supreme Court 's Bakke decision and the amicus 
briefs filed by corporate and military officials, most of the edito-
rials contend that universities should be able to weigh race as a 
factor in the admissions process because of the benefits that flow 
from a diverse classroom. Yet these same editorials believe that 
when points are awarded on the basis of race , such a system re-
sembles a racial quota , discriminates against whites , and post-
pones the day when America becomes a colorblind society. This 
perspective is quite consistent with the decisions of the Supreme 
Court . 
Most of the editorials clearly articulated this distinction be-
tween the two plans. As one editor cleverly noted , 
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When judges look for middle ground in a case and offer a lit-
tle something to both sides, it's called "splitting the baby." 
The reference , of course , is to wise King Solomon and his 
prudent decision to threaten to sever a baby as a ploy for get-
ting to the truth . What's often forgotten , of course , is that 
Solomon never actually did split the baby. And if he had, it 
would have been regarded as one of the most wrong-headed 
judicial rulings in history {A Wise, Affirmative Ruling 
2003) . 
Several editorials argued that the Court in its twin decisions 
was "splitting the baby" by simultaneously endorsing and reject-
ing the use of affirmative action by one university . And most 
found this Solomonic decision appropriate and correct, appreci-
ating the concluding comments by the previously quoted news-
paper. "In the two Michigan cases, by affirming affirmative ac-
tion while limiting the way it can be applied , the court ' split a 
baby ' and made good law." 
While most newspapers endorsed the Supreme Court's twin 
rulings, 25% of the newspapers we surveyed took issue with the 
Grutter decision, while only 3% challenge Gratz. Those op-
posed to Grutter argued that it is confusing , results in "reverse 
discrimination," divides the country and is wrong . For examp le, 
after describing the divided decision , an editorial from the Rocky 
Mountain News in Denver , Colorado states: 
The U.S. Supreme Court delivered a split decision Monday 
in two affirmative action cases at the University of Michi-
gan, guaranteeing that colleges and universities can con-
tinue to practice racial discrimination under the name of di-
versity, but only if they 're coy about it. ... The majority ac-
cepted Powell 's claim [in Bakke] that diversity is a "compel-
VOL. 34 2006 
SPL11TING THE BABY 
ling state interest" that potentially justifies race-based poli-
cies that would otherwise violate the constitutional right to 
equal protection under the law. This is a muddle (and we 
. won't even go into the tangle of conflicting and partial con-
currences and dissents) . In fact, it has been a muddle ever 
since Powell said it, except that in 1978 he was the only jus-
tice claiming diversity as compelling state interest. Now 
there are five votes for his claim. Diversity as a fact is a 
strength of the country. Diversity as an institution's recruit-
ment goal is actually commendable . But diversity as legal 
rationale for discriminatory practices by government is in 
conflict with the more fundamental principle that the state 
and the law should not treat people of one race differently 
from people of a different race, no matter how well-
intentioned the policy and no matter which group is pre-
ferred .... The decision in Gratz arguably undermines the de-
cision in Grutter .... (Jones 2003). 
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On the other hand, several newspapers stressed that Grutter 
was a wise decision, in part because it challenges misconceptions 
about race and the Constitution. An editorial from the St. Peters-
burg Tzmes most clearly articulates this response to the conserva-
tive critique of affirmative action by contending that " [t]hose 
who sought a simple declarative about race and higher education 
were disappointed by the Supreme Court," and by then explain-
ing : 
The Court peeled away two smothering layers of political 
pretense about affirmative action. The first is that the gov-
ernment should be out of the business of making decisions 
based on a person's race, that any form of racial distinction 
is pernicious. But race, as the Court said in a 5-4 opinion 
written by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor , is still a factor that 
can't be ignored. It shapes people's lives and opportunities, 
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and universities such as Michigan serve a vital role for soci-
ety when they provide racial diversity. The second fiction is 
that racial diversity can be achieved without consideration of 
race. President Bush and his brother , Governor Jeb Bush, 
asked the Court to follow their policies in Texas and Florida , 
which guarantee university admission to a certain percentage 
of graduates in every high school. The Court was unim -
pressed .... Race does indeed matter, which is why the na-
tion struggles with it, and why the Court 's decision was im-
perative (Race Still Matters , 2003). 
Thus , while the vast majority of the headline stories clearly 
noted the key rulings in the twin cases , there was considerable , 
and unsurprising , disagreement among the editors of these news-
papers when it came to analyzing the wisdom of the decisions . 
Recognized Impact and Implications of Grutter and Gratz 
The final question this study evaluates is whether or not the 
press reported stories about the impact and implications of the 
Grutter and Gratz decisions. "Impact " is defined as what oc-
curred immediately after the decisions , whereas " implications " 
denote what is likely to occur in the long run. All of the newspa-
pers did make some assessment of the impact and implications of 
the decisions . Indeed , scrutiny of the different publications re-
veals that newspapers observed two short-term consequences 
flowing from the cases . The first is that the Court made plain 
that it is constitutionally permissible for colleges to use race in 
the admissions process. The second is that the newspapers 
stressed that the Court specified what colleges could or could not 
do if they opted to adopt affirmative action plans. Consider the 
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following story that appeared in the Washington Post one day 
after the Supreme Court handed down the decisions in Grutter 
and Gratz: 
The Supreme Court issued a qualified but resounding en-
dorsement of affirmative action in higher education yester-
day, in a pair of decisions that, taken together, ratified diver-
sity as a rationale for race-conscious admissions and laid out 
constitutionally acceptable means for achieving it ... The 
net effect of the two rulings was to permit public and private 
universities to continue to use race as a "plus factor" in 
evaluating potential students- provided they take sufficient 
care to evaluate individually each applicant's ability to con-
tribute to a diverse student body (Lane 2003 ). 
In this article , the reporter indicates that one of the conse-
quences of the decisions is the continued use of race in the ad-
missions process, as long as universities and colleges engage in 
systematic, file-by-file analysis of each candidate's contribution 
to a more diverse student body. 
Like the Washington Post, the Boston Globe asserts that the 
impact of Gratz and Grutter was to remove constitutional doubts 
hanging over affirmative action programs and to offer guidance 
on how to put together a legally defensible affirmative action 
program. The Boston Globe distinguishes between mandatory 
affirmative action programs and voluntary programs. 
The rulings do not require undergraduate colleges or profes-
sional schools to use race as a factor, but allows them to do 
so. Affected are most educational institutions in the country 
that are selective in granting admissions , if they are run by 
government or receive public aid, including private elemen-
tary and high schools ... For an admissions plan using race to 
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be constitutional, the court majority said, it must be "truly 
individualized" and operate " in a flexible , nonmechanical 
way" (Denniston 2003). 
By discussing both the limits and significance of the decision , 
these particular articles provide both a context and an assessment 
of the implications of the decisions for their readers. However, 
this type of analysis was missing from most of the articles exam-
ined in our research. 
CONCLUSIONS AND ASSESSMENTS 
Most newspapers reported on the Grutter and Gratz rulings, 
addressed the legal queries in both cases, expressed support for 
these split judgments , and considered the repercussions of the 
rulings. On the basis of these findings, it might appear that the 
press did a thorough and accurate job translating and disseminat-
ing to the public the content and consequences of the cases. But 
this is not the whole story. Most interesting are the elements that 
were not mentioned in the press ' interpretation of these cases-
the concurring and dissenting opinions , and the political and le-
gal context. 
One of the fundamental findings of our study is that most of 
the press did not contextualize the cases. For example, they did 
not put into perspective the closeness of the votes-5 to 4 in Grut-
ter and 6 to 3 in Gratz . These narrow votes would seem to rein-
force the significance of possible retirements and replacements 
on the Court. At the time of the rulings, the expected retirement 
of O'Connor meant that a new Justice could portend changes in 
affirmative action policy (Lithwack 2004, Taylor 2004), and the 
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recent appointments of Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alita 
underscore and magnify that possibility. 
In addition, the majority of newspapers did not consider the 
legal milieu in which the Court considered Grutter and Gratz. 
Prior to the Supreme Court decisions, federal appellate courts 
had offered conflicting opinions as to whether colleges and uni-
versities could use race as a factor in admissions. In fact , the 
Fifth and Eleventh Courts of Appeal had ruled that colleges 
could not consider race in selecting students , while the Sixth 
Circuit had ruled otherwise. Frequently, when lower courts are 
divided , the Supreme Court steps in to clarify the law, which is 
precisely what the Supreme Court attempted to do in these two 
judgments . However, by " splitting the baby," the Court was able 
to provide each perspective precedental support in the deci-
sions-race can be used in admissions decisions, but cannot be 
used too extensively. 
Yet another consideration is that most newspapers did not 
place into context the telling fact that Gratz and Grutter did not 
accidentally arrive at the Supreme Court 's door. As many politi-
cal scientists have noted, there are a variety of societal and po-
litical factors that influence what cases the Supreme Court hears 
and decides. As a political body , the Court is influenced by na-
tional debates , albeit in a fashion markedly different from the 
other, electorally-accountable, branches. 
The Supreme Court [does] not cut these issues from whole 
cloth. Public debates over racially segregated schools, cen-
sorship, and government support of religion were all part of 
the national discourse prior to the Court 's involvement. The 
intensity of the debate waxed and waned with events, public 
opinion, or media attention; and these dialogues continued 
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after the Court began to express its views (Fleming, Bohte , 
and Wood 1997, 1225). 
In the case of affirmative action, the Michigan lawsuits re-
flected a concerted effort by conservative interest groups to sway 
the Court to invalidate affirmative action plans by bringing care-
fully framed litigation through the lower federal courts (Bean 
2004). A superficial examination of amici briefs submitted by 
supporters of the plaintiffs in both Gratz v. Bollinger and Grutter 
v. Bollinger expose the well-organized and well-funded interests 
of conservative groups whose bottom line goal is to eliminate 
policies that may burden white males in increasingly competitive 
settings (Taylor 2004, Phillips 2004) . 
Another point worth considering is the fact that most news 
accounts neglected to describe the nexus between affirmative 
action programs and past and present racial discrimination. The 
history of affirmative action policy and its subsequent discourse, 
conflicts, and decision-making creates a complex context that 
must be recounted to fully understand the impact of these deci-
sions. Gandy, et al. (1997, 160) explain that "depending on the 
ways in which the problem of inequality is framed, then, press 
coverage may lead citizens toward, or away from, support of 
particular public policies." This finding also reinforces the argu-
ment of Slotnick and Segal (1998) regarding the media's influ-
ence over public opinion towards the Bakke case and affirmative 
action in higher education. 
When considering the historical context of these cases and af-
firmative action policy, it is worth recalling the words of DuBois 
in 1903, when he said that the problem of the twentieth century 
is that of the color line. One hundred years later, in Gratz, Jus-
tice Ginsburg documented ongoing racial bias in education, em-
ployment, and housing; she looked upon affirmative action as 
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one remedy for differential treatment in policy areas. In her 
words, "the stain of generations of racial oppression is still visi-
ble in our society ... and the determination to hasten its removal 
remains vital." Justice Ginsburg saw the connection between 
America's racial history and affirmative action policy; most of 
the press did not. 
A final set of observations concerns the fact that, by failing to 
include in their reports dissenting opinions in Grutter and Gratz, 
the public was unable to develop a full or complete picture of the 
arguments against the Court's decisions to uphold a law school 
affirmative action plan and to strike down the undergraduate 
program. Newspapers' failure to cover all opinions may, as we 
have noted, be due to a variety of factors, including the press ' 
need to avoid the legal lexicon, limited time and space, and edi-
tors' determination that not all of the decisions were important 
enough to warrant coverage. Ironically, by covering solely the 
majority's determination, the press may enhance the judiciary 's 
legitimacy by presenting Court decisions as uncontested inter-
nally. Because the media did not provide competing understand-
ing of the rulings, either in editorials or in the Court's opinions 
themselves , the public may be more willing to simply accept the 
Court's decisions than to pursue additional means of avoiding 
compliance. 
While we have found that newspaper coverage of the Grutter 
and Gratz cases were more accurate than the television coverage 
Slotnick and Segal (1998) evaluated in Bakke, there were clear 
limitations to the reporting. This is unfortunate. In a democracy, 
the public is heavily reliant on the media to provide adequate and 
clear coverage of the judiciary. But in the Michigan cases , where 
the media accused the Court of "splitting the baby," newspapers 
did the same in their coverage. By reporting on the content of 
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the majority rulings but by failing to adequately discuss the 
background and implications of the decisions , the public was 
deprived of relevant information needed to assess the Court's 
judgments and the contested issue of affirmative action. 
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